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Abstract
The Robot Operating System (ROS) is a widely used open-source framework
for robot software development. Its increasing popularity, along with its
renowned features, such as its dynamic and distributed nature, call for a
safety and security protection mechanism which is not supplied as part of the
framework. This thesis presents ROSRV, a runtime verification framework for
ROS. ROSRV aims to address vulnerabilities in ROS in order to build more
reliable robots by enforcing security policies and monitoring safety properties.
It integrates with ROS seamlessly; in other words, it does not require any
change to the ROS source code or the robot software.
ROSRV has three major components: (1) a tool that provides an expressive
formal specification language to define safety properties, and automatically
generates monitors out of them, (2) a proxy node that manages these mon-
itors which transparently intercept and observe messages exchanged by the
computational units of ROS to ensure the system behaves as desired, and
(3) an access control policy administered by the proxy node to restrict the
impact of individual units on the overall system.
ROSRV has been tested on a commercial robot running ROS and the eval-
uations showed promising results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is the 21st century and robots are becoming more ubiquitous. It goes
without saying that they are here to stay due to their capabilities to either
replace humans in dangerous duties or to assist them overcome difficult tasks.
Current research on robotics is not only on advancing the prevailing human-
robot interaction, but it also strives to expedite the ordinariness of fully
autonomous robots. By all means, in order for them to be employable, let
alone helpful, we need them to operate safely and securely. This creates the
need for software that can automatically ensure safe and secure operation of
robots.
The focus of this thesis is the ROSRV framework, which is developed to
provide Runtime Verification for the Robot Operating System (ROS). ROS
owes its increasing popularity to its being an open-source framework support-
ing many standard operating system services and robot-specific libraries [23].
Its wide adoption calls for a protection mechanism as its current lack of such
a feature may pose an important threat against safe and secure operation of
robots. Moreover, ROS runs on a heterogeneous computer cluster, and its
dynamic and distributed properties make it infeasible to verify the system
statically, needless to mention the highly interactive nature of autonomous
robots for that matter. Therefore, our approach is to attack this problem
with runtime verification. We believe, even without an explicit threat, the
fact that the ROS environment is dynamic and versatile with changing pa-
rameters and newly joined nodes, justifies that the system benefits from
monitoring.
In the rest of this chapter, we will first briefly describe how ROS might be
prone to attacks and how monitoring may enhance applications (1.1), then
we will talk about our proposed solution and list our contributions (1.2), and
lastly we will give an outline of the rest of the thesis (1.3).
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1.1 Problem Description
In the general sense, the Robot Operating System (ROS) [19] is an open-
source framework for developing robot software. ROS operates on top of
a heterogeneous distributed cluster of host operating systems and provides
a communication layer between nodes which constitute the computational
parts of the robot. At runtime, ROS nodes (i.e. processes) are connected on
a peer-to-peer topology. This particular setup demands a centralized “name
service” (referred to as the ROSMaster in the rest of the thesis) in order for
nodes to find each other and start communicating on channels called topics.
After this brief introduction to the overall system, we believe it is important
to bring up a few design decisions that play an important role in what ROS
does and does not provide.
The primary goal of ROS is to support code reuse across frameworks and
applications to help facilitate robotics research [23]. The idea of making
it a distributed framework of nodes also increases the feasibility and flexi-
bility of designing individual executables which become loosely-coupled at
runtime. However, with the addition of the fact that safety is almost al-
ways application-specific into the equation, this greater power brings about
greater difficulties in terms of providing a comprehensive methodology as
part of ROS to satisfy everybody’s safety needs. Since the aim of communi-
cation in the system is solely defined by the application, it is more favorable
to grant application developers the privilege of specifying safety properties
with an easy-to-use and expressive method, rather than to include vague
means of safety support as part of the framework which may add undesired
complexity.
Another crucial design aspect is the importance of names in ROS. From
registering nodes to looking up parameters, everything is associated with a
name and has to comply with the naming conventions. There are conse-
quences of giving names the top priority when it comes to identification. For
example, when a second node with the same name is introduced to the sys-
tem, the first node is automatically shut down [10]. This situation makes
ROS vulnerable in the case of an attack, as an attacker can easily fake a
node and misdirect a robot by publishing bogus messages on important top-
ics. Security issues in ROS is not only limited to taking advantage of this
particular design decision. Currently, ROS does not offer any protection
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mechanism against preventing nodes from freely querying the ROSMaster
about system state and sending shutdown commands to kill arbitrary nodes.
These are important problems in need of addressing to build more reliable
robots.
1.2 Contributions
We developed a runtime verification framework called ROSRV, to improve
safety and security of robots developed using ROS. ROSRV integrates with
ROS seamlessly in the sense that it does not require any changes to the ROS
source code or application code (executed by nodes) itself. Our intention
was to (1) address possible safety needs of applications and (2) make up
for existing security vulnerabilities in ROS. We approached the first prob-
lem by integrating monitoring into the system. This is achieved by placing
user-defined monitors as men-in-the-middle in communication channels (i.e.
topics) and managing them with the help of a proxy node, called RVMaster,
located on top of the ROSMaster. The core functionality of monitors is to
intercept, observe and optionally modify or drop messages circulating in the
system among nodes. We designed our monitors to act like ordinary pub-
lishers and subscribers so that the system does not become aware of being
monitored. The second problem is avoided by supervising nodes’ communica-
tions with the ROSMaster. We implemented an access control policy exerted
by the RVMaster that dictates which nodes are allowed to send requests and
commands to the ROSMaster for execution.
Since our goal is to cater to a variety of applications, our framework had
to be easy-to-use and expressive, meaning that users were not to be con-
cerned with the internals of how monitoring works. Therefore, we developed
a specification language in compliance with the Monitoring-Oriented Pro-
gramming paradigm [6], for users to easily specify safety properties. From
these specifications, monitors are automatically generated and incorporated
into the framework and user-defined actions are executed upon violation or
validation of safety properties at runtime according to system behavior.
We tested our framework on LandShark1, an unmanned ground vehicle
(UGV) running ROS, and demonstrated how ROSRV improved the safety
1The LandShark UGV is a product of Black-i Robotics (www.blackirobotics.com).
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and security of LandShark by monitoring the system against specified safety
properties and enforcing access control. Our experiments with various moni-
tors showed that our specification language is capable of expressing different
kinds of safety requirements, and our framework is successful in delivering
user demands.
We also performed performance evaluations based on simple test cases.
These tests revealed that no matter how long the execution time, the number
of messages not received by the subscriber due to monitoring delay, does not
exceed a few.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We developed a simple and expressive specification language and a tool
called ROSMOP for users to define safety properties without being
obliged to know the internals of the ROS communication system for
monitoring needs.
2. We implemented ROSRV, a runtime verification framework for ROS,
that manages monitors automatically generated by ROSMOP out of
specifications, to check dynamic behavior during system execution with-
out the system being aware.
3. We integrated an access control mechanism into our framework to re-
strict the communication of nodes with the ROSMaster in order to
prevent possibly malicious commands to be executed arbitrarily.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the Robot Operating System concepts (2.1) and
Monitoring-Oriented Programming (2.2) in more detail. Chapter 3 discusses
several concerns in general to present our motivation, with a focus on possi-
ble shortcomings of ROS on our case study robot LandShark to illustrate the
existence of the problem. In Chapter 4, we present our framework ROSRV,
by focusing on three major components: RVMaster (4.1) is the proxy node
which sits on top of the ROSMaster; it is in charge of regulating monitors
(4.2) and administering system accessibility (4.3). In Chapter 5, we present
4
our evaluation metrics and results. Lastly, we conclude our work and talk
about possible future directions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we talk about the ROS communication concepts and intro-
duce Monitoring-Oriented Programming.
2.1 The Robot Operating System (ROS)
The Robot Operating System (ROS [19]) is an open-source meta-operating
system for robot software development. Although it is not an operating
system in the traditional sense of process management and scheduling, it
provides certain services that an operating system would [23], such as hard-
ware abstraction, low-level device control, various filesystem functionalities,
message-passing between processes, etc. Since ROS’s main goal is to fa-
cilitate code reuse in robotics research and development (including across
platforms), it also provides tools and libraries to make the code distribution
and execution as easy as possible. The framework is already implemented in
at least 3 languages to aid this cause, with a few other languages in currently
experimental stage. This thesis focuses on the C++ implementation.
ROS communication is based on a peer-to-peer (potentially distributed)
network of processes. Due to these peers becoming loosely-coupled at run-
time, this communication infrastructure is called a “graph.” There are a few
different styles of communication supported by ROS for processes to connect.
These are mainly synchronous RPC-style communication over services, asyn-
chronous streaming of data over topics, and storage of data on a Parameter
Server.
The following basic concepts make up the ROS Computation Graph [20]
by contributing to data exchange in the framework in one way or another.
Nodes Nodes are the previously referred processes that perform computa-
tion and help control the robot collectively. Since ROS is designed to be
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modular, usually a robot control system consists of many nodes, each
of which has a distinct task in terms of computation in order to help
lead the robot. ROS nodes are written by using ROS client libraries
available for different implementation languages.
Master The ROSMaster (as referred to in this thesis for clarity) is respon-
sible for providing name registration and lookup. The rest of the com-
ponents constituting the Computation Graph benefit from and depend
on the services the ROSMaster provides to find each other and com-
municate.
Parameter Server The Parameter Server can be considered as a shared
dictionary that nodes use to store and retrieve data. It is currently
implemented as part of the ROSMaster.
Messages Inter-node communication happens by means of messages. A
message resembles a C struct in the sense that it is a data structure
containing typed fields of either primitive types (e.g. integer, floating
point, boolean, etc.), arrays of primitive types, or nested structures.
Topics The most common case of inter-node communication in ROS is based
on publish/subscribe semantics. In this transport system, a node sends
out a message by publishing it to a particular topic, and a node that
is interested in a certain sort of data subscribes to the proper topic. In
this sense, a topic is simply a name for identifying the content of the
message. In ROS, multiple concurrent publishers and subscribers are
allowed for a single topic, as well as, a single node publishing and/or
subscribing to multiple topics. It is important to note that in this sys-
tem, publishers and subscribers are not required to know of each others’
existence in advance. This design serves the purpose of decoupling the
production and consumption of information.
Services Services are used for request/reply interactions where many-to-
many publish/subscribe semantics falls short. For this type of transport
system, a pair of message structures -one for the request and one for
the reply- is needed. This type of communication is usually similar to
a remote procedure call, where a node offers a service associated with
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Figure 2.1: ROS Communication Architecture
a name, and another uses the service by sending the request message
and awaiting the reply.
Bags Bags are helpful in saving and replaying ROS messages. They espe-
cially come in handy for storage and analysis of data, such as messages
emitted by a sensor on the robot, which might be crucial in developing
and testing algorithms.
Figure 2.1 illustrates an overview of the ROS communication architecture.
ROS nodes run XMLRPC servers managed by the ROS client library, and
each node is assigned a URI, which corresponds to the host:port of the XML-
RPC server they are running. ROS nodes use XMLRPC connections for two
purposes. First, they need to report their registration information to the
ROSMaster. This XMLRPC call includes the node’s URI, the name of the
topic of interest, the data type (i.e. message name) for the topic, and a pa-
rameter for the ROSMaster to be able to make callbacks to the node in case
new publishers/subscribers join the system wanting to connect on the same
topic or when a node’s registration information has changed. ROS client
libraries also support commands that query/update the system parameters
and the runtime state by communicating with the ROSMaster, such as ask-
ing for published/subscribed topics of a node, killing a node, getting a list of
all the published topics and their types, etc. The second use of XMLRPC by
nodes is for peer-to-peer connection negotiation and configuration. However,
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this type of communication is not used to transport topic or service data.
As the figure indicates, nodes connect to other nodes directly. The role of
the ROSMaster in inter-node communication is to only provide the lookup
service for subscribers to find available publishers on particular topics via
callbacks. The use of callbacks and the important role given to names ease
the decoupling of the two sides. Publishers may generate messages on topics
without actually knowing if there are any subscribers listening. And sub-
scribers may show interest in listening to topics without a publisher being
present. Eventually for a connection to be established and messages to be
routed, the essential thing is that the topic and the declared type (i.e. mes-
sage) should be matching, which both come down to names. This allows
the two parties (i.e. publishers and subscribers) being started, killed, and
restarted in any order without causing any errors.
The following is a likely scenario that explains the initiation of message
exchange between nodes [24]:
1. Subscriber starts and registers with the ROSMaster with the informa-
tion on which topic it wants to subscribe to (via XMLRPC )
2. Publisher starts and registers with the ROSMaster with the information
on which topic it wants to publish to (via XMLRPC )
3. The ROSMaster informs Subscriber that a new Publisher has joined
via a callback and passes on Publisher’s URI (via XMLRPC )
4. Subscriber contacts Publisher to request a topic connection and nego-
tiate the transport protocol (via XMLRPC )
5. Publisher sends Subscriber the settings for the selected transport pro-
tocol (via XMLRPC )
6. Subscriber initiates the connection with Publisher using the selected
transport protocol (via TCPROS, etc.)
For transport protocol negotiation in the 4th step, Subscriber sends Pub-
lisher a list of supported protocols. Publisher then selects an appropriate
protocol from that list in the 5th step, and returns the necessary information
back to Subscriber so it can establish a separate connection for message trans-
fer. The most general protocol used in ROS for topic transport is TCPROS,
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which uses stateful, persistent TCP/IP socket connections. UDPROS is an-
other transport protocol supported by ROS.
2.2 Monitoring-Oriented Programming
(MOP)
Monitoring-Oriented Programming (MOP) [6] is a generic monitoring frame-
work which aims to reduce the gap between formal specification and imple-
mentation by comparing the latter’s accuracy against the former at runtime.
MOP’s main goal is to support and encourage building reliable software.
MOP tools provide automatic synthesis of monitors out of user-specified
properties defined using logical formalisms, and their integration into the
original system. These integrated monitors observe the system’s dynamic be-
havior during execution, and trigger user-defined handling actions upon val-
idation or violation of a property. MOP can be classified as (1) a lightweight
formal method, (2) an extension to programming languages with logics, and
(3) a discipline allowing one to improve safety, reliability and dependability
of a system by monitoring its requirements against its implementation at
runtime. It is important to note that despite being firmly based on logical
formalisms and mathematical techniques, MOP is not an attempt on pro-
gram verification. The philosophy behind MOP is to exactly not verify an
implementation against its specification before operation, but to not let it go
wrong at runtime.
MOP instances are named after the programming language or platform
they are developed for. So far there are three MOP instances which are
JavaMOP [5], BusMOP [2], and ROSMOP [8], the last being the focus of
this thesis. All MOP instances share the following five orthogonal attributes
of the MOP framework [16]: programming language, logic, scope, running
mode and handlers. The programming language decides the language of the
applications that are to be monitored. In the case of ROSMOP, this corre-
sponds to C++, as we deal with the C++-implementation of ROS. The logic
refers to the formalism used to specify the property. MOP offers a selection
of logics so that users can choose the most appropriate one for their applica-
tions, or omit it altogether if that is the best fit. ROSMOP currently supports
FSM and CFG logics. The scope specifies where to check the property. Its
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variety may change from instance to instance. The running mode denotes
where/when the monitoring code runs. ROSMOP monitors are integrated
into the ROSRV framework and they are run online, i.e. simultaneously with
the other publishers and subscribers of the topic of interest. The handlers
specify what actions to be taken upon violation or validation of properties.
Even if users choose not to define properties via formalisms for various rea-
sons, MOP still provides means for writing custom monitoring codes and
their execution. The rest of this chapter focuses on the MOP framework in
general; more information on ROSMOP can be found in Chapter 4.2.1.
Every MOP instance extends the MOP framework in four dimensions: (1)
a specification language based on the problem domain which prescribes how
to define events, (2) a target language for generated monitors, (3) supported
logic formalisms, and (4) the handlers allowed in the specification. The MOP
framework provides a base for its instances to build upon. One of these build-
ing blocks is the generic MOP syntax which each MOP instance specializes
in a form that conforms to the problem domain by defining syntactic cate-
gories (non-terminals). Figure 2.2 shows the shared MOP syntax [7] which
uses Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [1]. According to the grammar,
non-terminals are surrounded by “〈” and “〉”. Braces (“{” and “}”) indicate
the portion enclosed may appear zero or more times. Brackets (“[” and “]”)
indicate the portion enclosed is optional.
Here, we will explain the common syntax constructs in MOP:
〈Specification〉 It describes the generic MOP specification syntax, which is
the base for its MOP instance- and logic-specific counterpart.
〈Event〉 Its declaration serves two purposes. First, it makes it possible to
refer to in the 〈Property〉, and second, it may have arbitrary code
(〈Instance Action〉) declared along that is run whenever the event is
observed. The associated code helps modify the program or the monitor
state.
〈Property〉 MOP specifications may contain zero or more properties. As the
syntax of 〈Property〉 suggests, it consists of a named formalism (〈Logic
Name〉) and a property specification using the named formalism (〈Logic
Syntax〉). If the specification does not have a property declared, then
it is called raw. If the user does not find the available logic plugins
11
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expressive or efficient enough, (s)he may opt for a raw specification
and embed custom monitoring code inside the 〈Instance Action〉.
〈Property Handler〉 Handlers include arbitrary code from the instance
source language to be invoked when a certain logic state or category is
reached.
The following constructs may differ for each MOP instance:
〈Instance Modifier〉 These are specific to the language each MOP instance
supports. Syntactically, they can be any valid identifier the language of
the instance allows. They change the behavior of the monitoring code.
〈Instance Parameters〉 If present, they make a specification parametric,
using the MOP instance language. However, parametricity typically
depends on the language and not all MOP instances are parametric,
therefore this non-terminal may be empty.
〈Instance Declaration〉 This is another portion that is specific to the lan-
guage supported in the particular MOP instance. Instance declarations
correspond to the declarations of monitor-local variables.
〈Instance Event Definition〉 These define the conditions under which an
event is triggered. They are again specific to the MOP instance lan-
guage.
〈Instance Action〉 Actions are arbitrary code associated with events and
they are executed when the events they are attached to are observed.
An action may modify the running program or a monitor state. The
syntax of the allowed statements depend on the particular MOP in-
stance. These statements usually differ in variables and functions they
refer to compared to the ones used in handlers. This is the reason why
there are separate non-terminals for actions and handlers.
〈Instance Handler〉 These are arbitrary code that are executed when a
property handler is triggered.
The rest of the constructs are logic plugin-specific:
〈Logic Name〉 It is an identifier that declares the logic of the property.
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〈Logic Syntax〉 It refers to the syntax of the actual property definition for
each plugin.
〈Logic State〉 They refer to monitor stages or categories a handler may
be written for. They are declared as constants and their definition is
property-specific.
Another building block that the MOP framework provides for its instances
is the logic plugins. Every logic plugin is an implementation and encapsula-
tion of a monitor synthesis algorithm for a particular specification formalism.
A set of events and a formula or pattern based on the formalism are fed to the
logic plugin in order to get an output of an abstract monitor which checks a
trace of events against the given formula. More information on various MOP
logic plugins can be found in [16].
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Chapter 3
Motivation and Case Study
Robots now are employed in so many areas. Examples include military
robots, medical robots, and home security robots. Despite such diverse ap-
plication domains, the need for their security and safety is a subject agreed
upon by all researchers from all kinds of fields, and of course end users, too.
To go over a few of the concerns, let us first emphasize that even a minute
mistake in the mechanics of the robot or the software that operates it, means
a huge risk against lives that conduct the robot, get serviced by the robot or
simply anyone within its range. Take, for example, the instance of the semi-
autonomous robotic cannon that was deployed by the South African army
in October 2007 during a shooting exercise [17]. Due to a probable software
glitch, the computerized gun went out of control and started shooting. This
overlooked error ended up taking 9 lives and injuring 11 others. Another case
where precision and submissiveness have utmost importance is the field of
medicine. Nowadays, robotic arms are trusted to perform vital surgical tasks
on patients. Even though engineers try their best to meet the functionality
and reliability requirements, the variety of purposes and the complexity it
brings in terms of choice of sensors and actuation capabilities, may lead to
unfortunate yet critical oversight during their composition. Our motivation is
that when the possibility of errors is undeniable, there should be another level
of safety which oversees the system in action and interferes with it in order
to prevent dire consequences. We believe this can be achieved by monitoring
the system at runtime. There is one such work focused on medical robotics
which agrees that runtime monitoring is indeed a viable solution [14].
To name another concern, hacking is a serious attack that should be looked
out for [18]. All the favorable features of a robot that make people want to
use it in the first place, such as its strength or surveillance, could be turned
against them if the robot is prone to hacking. Consider home security robots
equipped with surveillance devices. If the control of these robots and/or
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devices is taken over by unauthorized parties, the very assistant of yours
that you trust for your protection, could easily become a threat to your
privacy. In the case of military robots, hijacked sensors or controllers may
cause even more disastrous situations. Therefore, it is important to supply
the system with an adequate security protection mechanism.
We tested our framework’s monitoring and access control capabilities on
a robot called LandShark. The LandShark UGV has an onboard Linux box
running ROS. Furthermore, it is equipped with various devices, such as a
GPS sensor, a radar, cameras, motor and turret controllers, and a paintball
gun. Each device has a driver and a corresponding ROS node which pub-
lishes sensor data and/or subscribes to topics to receive ROS messages that
command the operation of the robot. An operator control unit (OCU) node
listens to messages from the robot and sends it user commands.
Here, we will talk about two of the monitors we developed for LandShark.
Figure 3.1: LandShark not allowed in the green zone
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The figures included are screenshots taken from the Webots1 simulator show-
ing a replica of the robot.
Figure 3.1 shows a green area where the robot is not allowed to enter. Upon
reaching the border of this unsafe zone, even though the operator commands
the robot to move forward by pressing the associated button on the OCU,
these messages are dropped by the monitor to prevent the command from
being conveyed. For clarity, the user-specified monitor can also print out a
message indicating that this move is prohibited.
Figure 3.2: LandShark shooting itself
Figure 3.2 shows the scenario where LandShark shoots itself because it
does not have a mechanism that checks whether the gun is pointing at itself
or not. This problem may seem trivial as one might suggest to implement an
easy check as part of the gun turret driver software. However, our focus is not
figuring out missing elements or criticize the lack thereof. We still think that
safety-critical robots may greatly benefit from monitoring, especially when
there are examples of even thoroughly tested systems sometimes failing at
runtime. For this example, the monitor again drops the messages coming
from the OCU that were to be received by the driver and interpreted as the
trigger command, if the gun happens to be aimed at the robot.
1Webots is a development environment used to model, program and simulate mobile
robots (www.cyberbotics.com).
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In addition to monitors, we also tested our access control policy on Land-
Shark. Although safety concerns can be addressed by monitors, there is still
a security deficiency in ROS. As nodes can be replaced rather easily, it is
possible for attackers to fake a driver node or the OCU and misdirect the
robot. Our solution for avoiding malicious conduct is supplying a configura-
tion file in which the user specifies trusted IP addresses that correspond to
various devices controlling the robot. In our attempts to replace the OCU of
LandShark, we successfully failed and demonstrated our access control policy
works as expected.
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Chapter 4
ROSRV
ROSRV [9] is designed to address the safety and security issues in ROS-based
robot applications. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the ROSRV communi-
cation architecture [13]. As depicted, the main difference between ROS and
ROSRV architectures is the RVMaster proxy node which manages the inser-
tion of monitors in the middle of communication channels in a transparent
way. This additional layer on the original system protects both the ROS-
Master from a security perspective, and the safety of the application from
a functional point of view. With the inclusion of this extra layer, all node
requests that were meant to be received and handled by the ROSMaster
are intercepted by the RVMaster, and all messages on desired topics can be
monitored. Thus, the intended safety and security policies are enforced.
An important feature of the framework is that it does not require any
Figure 4.1: ROSRV Communication Architecture
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change to the ROS source code or the application code. The only requirement
for ROSRV to work with ROS is to configure the ROS MASTER URI environ-
ment variable. This variable corresponds to the host:port of the XMLRPC
server the ROSMaster runs. All other nodes communicate with the ROSMas-
ter using the default port that it binds to. By binding the RVMaster to the
standard port that the ROSMaster binds to by default, all XMLRPC calls
meant for the ROSMaster are directed to the RVMaster. In the meanwhile,
ROS MASTER URI is configured so that the ROSMaster listens at a hidden
port that is only visible to the RVMaster. This is implemented by installing
a firewall that blocks access to the new ROSMaster port. With the help of
this configuration, the rest of the system remains the same; nodes continue
to communicate with the “Master” in the same way, i.e. by sending XML-
RPC requests to the default port. Moreover, since the RVMaster becomes
the proxy for the ROSMaster, by manipulating URIs, it can insert monitors
in between ordinary publishers and subscribers without them being aware.
Figure 4.2 shows the components of ROSRV. Two of them, monitor spec-
ifications and access control policy, are inputs supplied by the user. Moni-
tor specifications are written using an expressive formal language to define
safety properties. These specifications are parsed by the ROSMOP tool and
automatically converted into monitors that the RVMaster integrates into the
system and orchestrates at runtime. An access control policy configuration
Figure 4.2: System Overview
20
provided by the user is enforced by the RVMaster to ensure that nodes may
inquire about or alter the state of the robot as long as they are allowed to
do so and their declared authenticity is not breached.
In the rest of this chapter, we will talk about the individual components
of ROSRV in more detail.
4.1 RVMaster
The main component of ROSRV is the node RVMaster. It is the main com-
ponent because, other than its most important role of being in control of
enforcing security policies and monitoring safety properties, it is the reason
why ROSRV can be defined as transparent. First of all, its only requirement
being the reassignment of ports is what makes ROSRV’s integration with
ROS seamless. Secondly, its smart algorithm for managing monitors, includ-
ing their activation/deactivation and placement in between other nodes, is
the basis for why monitors are not detected in the system as extraordinary
processes, but perceived as every other node publishing/subscribing to topics.
Despite its crucial role, the logic behind it is actually rather simple. Al-
though it acts like the “Master”, in reality, it does not take over what the
ROSMaster does in terms of bookkeeping. At the implementation level, the
RVMaster wraps the Master API [12] that ROS client libraries call for node
registration/unregistration or to retrieve system state information. Upon
receiving XMLRPC calls from nodes, it checks these requests against the
user-provided access control policy configuration to see whether that partic-
ular node should be granted what it asks for. If it is the case that it does
not violate the specified security policy, the RVMaster makes a call to the
ROSMaster itself with the same parameters. This way, the security of the
robot is protected by not letting the ROSMaster execute each and every
(possibly malicious) command coming from arbitrary nodes. Furthermore,
by only wrapping the API, the RVMaster remains comparatively lightweight
as it does not implement all the name service features the ROSMaster is
responsible for. The specifics of access control policy configuration in terms
of node identification and types of requests is discussed in Chapter 4.3.
System monitoring is a bit trickier than administering XMLRPC calls for
access control. The role of the RVMaster here is to keep track of all the
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communication requests by nodes so that monitors can be injected when
necessary to those peer-to-peer communication channels of interest as men-
in-the-middle. Once ROSMOP automatically generates the ROS-appropriate
monitoring code (further discussed in Chapter 4.2.1) out of user-defined spec-
ifications, it is the RVMaster’s job to manage them, from their initializations
to their activation statuses at runtime. Although monitors act like ordinary
nodes, their creation is not handled by ROS client libraries. The RVMaster
implements the XMLRPC API in order to have full control over monitors. In
the usual case, when nodes are written using the ROS client libraries, their
interaction with the ROSMaster and the initiation of topic transports with
other nodes are handled by those libraries. This means in most cases, users
are not expected to code using the XMLRPC API for their nodes to connect
to others. The ROS client libraries conveniently hide the details of this type
of communication from users, and handle it for them. Monitors, on the other
hand, are created directly from inside the RVMaster, and their communica-
tion with the rest of the system is managed through explicit XMLRPC calls.
This makes it easier for the RVMaster to deal with callbacks when it needs to
insert monitors and yet does not want to let other nodes know about them.
The following is how monitoring works in the system (for a better under-
standing, please read about the ROS inter-node communication in Chap-
ter 2.1): All monitors are compiled with the RVMaster before it is started.
When the RVMaster starts -the ROSMaster starts automatically at this
point- it initializes all available monitor nodes in the system and registers
them as subscribers to topics. However, this does not mean that they are
active; the user is given the option to activate or deactivate any monitors at
any given time during execution. This design prevents the overhead caused
by monitoring from affecting the performance when it is not desired. We will
assume that we have one monitor on one topic and it is activated from this
point forward. If at this point, there are no other nodes interested in the
topic, it simply does not do anything; as an ordinary subscriber would do, it
waits for a callback that will inform it of newly joined publishers. When a
publisher registers on the same topic, the monitor receives its URI in order
to initiate a topic transport negotiation. After the connection is established
between the two, all messages from the publisher are received by the monitor.
If the first registered node after the system start and monitor registra-
tion, is instead a subscriber, the RVMaster tells the ROSMaster to register
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the subscriber, but it makes a note that when a publisher becomes avail-
able on that topic, the callback the subscriber receives about this situation
will include the monitor’s URI instead of the actual publisher’s. This way,
the monitor will receive all messages coming from the publisher, and after
observation and potential modification, it will send them to the subscriber
pretending like it is the original publisher. Note that, monitors do not create
and send messages themselves naturally. They only relay messages coming
from publishers. That is why when the first node available is a subscriber, a
connection between the subscriber and the monitor is not established right
away, and rather postponed until after a publisher registers.
Since the RVMaster has all the URI information it needs and it inter-
cepts all XMLRPC requests received from nodes, when nodes want to query
the system state about available publishers/subscribers, the RVMaster can
successfully hide the presence of monitors. In addition, monitor activa-
tion/deactivation at runtime is again simply handled by callbacks. Alerting
publishers/subscribers that the connection information of their correspon-
dents has changed easily does the job when a monitor becomes active and
needs to intercept messages, for example. This situation being common in
ROS -as nodes may be replaced when a second node with the same name is
introduced, this has to happen anyway- is the beauty of it.
The RVMaster also supports additional XMLRPC calls for users to be able
to query the state of monitors, especially for debugging purposes. The two
options it provides are (1) to list the available monitors and their activation
statuses, and (2) to give more comprehensive information about the runtime
verification state. This includes, the ports the RVMaster and the ROSMaster
bind to, and a list of all the monitors with their node names, the topics they
monitor, the ports of their XMLRPC server, and lastly their (usually) TCP
ports that they use to connect to other nodes.
On a note about our earlier design approach of monitors, they were first
considered as merely interceptors in between publishers and subscribers on
topics which were only concerned about messages sent and received on that
particular topic. However, later on we realized that this approach falls short
when users want to publish a message from inside the monitor on another
topic based on the information carried by the received message. For example,
one may want to monitor messages containing the information of a robot’s
position and when the robot moves out of a restricted area, an alarm message
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on a different topic needs to be sent. For this purpose, we had to change
both our design and implementation. Our current method handles this issue
by keeping a pointer map of topics shared among monitors, to be able to
publish to any of them at any time as needed. This requirement also enabled
us to implement better monitors which act more like ordinary ROS nodes.
Next, we will focus on the user side of monitoring, as we will explain how
specifications are converted into monitors that the RVMaster can handle.
4.2 Monitoring Safety Properties
The RVMaster manages monitors at runtime in order to protect the appli-
cation functionally, but it does not generate them itself. ROSMOP is the
tool that takes monitor specifications and generates C++ code that the RV-
Master can work with. In other words, they can be initialized, activated and
deactivated by the RVMaster, but if the user specifies a certain action to be
taken or requires a computation based on contents of messages intercepted,
this is incorporated into the monitor by the help of ROSMOP.
In this section, we will first take a look at ROSMOP in detail and explain
how user-defined specifications in MOP syntax are converted into C++ mon-
itoring code and correspond to callbacks in which messages are received and
sent. Then, one of the monitor specifications will be explained in detail to
demonstrate how easy it is to construct a monitor from user’s perspective.
4.2.1 ROSMOP
ROSMOP [8] is an MOP instance specifically designed to integrate moni-
tors into the ROS framework. Its current implementation is devised to work
within ROSRV, as its generated monitoring library is particular in its design
to be used by the RVMaster. ROSMOP can take multiple specifications as
input at a time, and carefully handles their complexity to make sure there
is only one callback generated per topic in the end. This is because ROS
allows only one callback registration per topic. However, with ROSMOP
keeping the metadata when merging all monitoring code under one callback,
the RVMaster can still support multiple monitors defined on a single topic.
In some cases, the user is warned before the library generation is attempted
if there are any possible complications foreseen due to contradictory defini-
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〈ROSMOP Specification〉 ::= 〈Id〉 “(” 〈C++ Parameters〉 “)”“{”
[〈C++ Declarations〉]
〈Event〉+
{〈Property〉
{〈Property Handler〉}}
“}”
〈Event〉 ::= “event” 〈Id〉 “(” 〈C++ Parameters〉 “)”
〈ROS-related Parameters〉
“{” 〈Extended C++ Statements〉 “}”
〈ROS-related Parameters〉 ::= topic message “'{”parameter-message access pattern“'}”
〈Property〉 ::= 〈Logic Name〉 “ : ” 〈Logic Syntax〉
〈Property Handler〉 ::= “@” 〈Logic State〉 “{” 〈C++ Statements〉 “}”
Figure 4.3: ROSMOP Syntax
tions, such as the same global variable declaration in multiple specifications.
After successful generation of the monitoring library, it is placed correctly
in ROSRV so the RVMaster works smoothly at runtime. The RVMaster
is factored in such a way that the monitoring code is separate from the
other components. The monitoring library and the RVMaster communicate
through a predefined API, so that even when new monitors are generated by
ROSMOP, the RVMaster codebase still remains unchanged. Therefore, all in
all, the only thing users need to do to monitor their ROS setup, is to supply
the specifications and push the button to watch it in action.
ROSMOP specification files end with the extension “.rv”. In one file,
there may be multiple specifications defined. Figure 4.3 shows the instan-
tiated ROSMOP syntax. According to this syntax, each named ROSMOP
specification consists of optional global variable declarations, one or more
events, and zero or more properties.
Global variables declared may facilitate interaction between events. For
example, one might need to monitor one topic in order to get certain infor-
mation about the robot, and according to that information, (s)he may need
to interact with messages on another intercepted topic. This can be done
by allocating a global variable. Also, in the case of multiple specifications
parsed at once, these global variables get merged into one place. So, they
can actually be helpful in getting monitors to collaborate as well, in addition
to only across events in a single monitor.
As every other registration XMLRPC call is handled, monitors, too, need
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to provide topics and their corresponding message types. This is incorpo-
rated into the event signature in ROSMOP. Moreover, ROSMOP supports
parametric events in order to access the specified message’s fields. To bind
to those fields, parameters need to be matched in the provided pattern to
the appropriate fields. This way, the user may observe and optionally modify
the message content through declared references.
Extended C++ statements constitute the event action. Event action is
where users may define what monitors will do after observing message con-
tent. If the intended action is to log the messages, for example, they can do
so by writing C++ code in the event action, and the monitor will do just
that with the message before it relays it to subscribers. Therefore, event
actions are where users may dictate monitors to do extra computations or
change the monitor status. The reason these C++ statements are referred to
as extended, is because we incorporated two additional keywords into the lan-
guage, which are PUBLISH and MESSAGE. PUBLISH keyword helps users
when they want to publish to another topic from inside the event action of
the current topic. By using this keyword, users can make monitors publish
to any other available topics which may or may not be intercepted by that
monitor through its events. In some cases, we saw that all the fields of a
message need to be accessed and stored in a global variable for its use in
another event. Instead of doing so by writing out all the necessary parame-
ters and matching them in the message pattern section, MESSAGE keyword
does that automatically for you.
ROSMOP currently supports two logic plugins: FSM [4] and CFG [3]. The
FSM plugin encapsulates the monitoring algorithm where the current state
of a deterministic finite state machine is represented by an integer. With the
observation of each event, the value of the current state and the received event
together determine the next state of the finite state machine. The CFG plugin
allows users to create monitors out of context free grammar descriptions. It
uses a modified version of the standard table driven GLR parsing algorithm.
The synthesized monitors are based on push-down automata. Logic plugins
support either predefined states or uses of aliases to describe states. One
can match these states by using “@ 〈Logic State〉” to attach arbitrary C++
statements to define actions in property handlers which are executed upon
validation or violation of the property.
As mentioned, when there are multiple specifications as input, and multi-
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ple events on one topic, those event actions get merged to output only one
callback per topic. ROSMOP names monitors after their specification IDs.
So users are encouraged to think that each single specification corresponds
to one monitor. Even though, the event actions are merged to output a
single callback to comply with ROS standards, the information about which
event belongs to which specification (hence, which monitor) is kept during
the transformation. Therefore, at runtime, the RVMaster can still manage
the execution of designated event actions even when a certain monitor is not
active but the other is, which both have an action declared on the same topic.
Next, an example monitor specification will be explained in order to make
more sense of the ROSMOP language syntax in terms of applicability.
4.2.2 Monitor Specifications
After going over the language syntax, here we will analyze the safe triggering
monitor specification that was mentioned in Chapter 3.
	 safeTrigger() {
	      bool isSafeTrigger = false;
	      event checkPosition(string N, double P)
	             /landshark/joint_states sensor_msgs/JointState
	            ‘{name[1]:N, position[1]:P}’  { 
	      if (N=="turret_tilt"){if (P > -0.45){ //check gun position
	                         isSafeTrigger = true;
	                   }else{
	                         isSafeTrigger = false;
	      }     }    }
	      event safeTrigger() /landshark_control/trigger
                 landshark_msgs/PaintballTrigger ‘{}’  {
	              if(!isSafeTrigger) return; //drop trigger message
	      }
	 }
Figure 4.4: Safe Trigger Specification
As explained in the previous section, safety properties imposed as mon-
itors at runtime are defined by means of specifications basically consisting
of events, actions, and properties (omitted in raw specifications). Figure 4.4
shows an example of a specification to illustrate the idea. This specification
is raw ; it does not have an explicit property declared. Instead, user-defined
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custom monitoring code is embedded into event actions which can be any
C++ code.
The safety condition we want to monitor here requires that the robot can
only fire in certain safe poses. If the gun happens to be directed at the robot,
it results in the message being dropped by the monitor in order to prevent
triggering. There are two events, checkPosition and safeTrigger, which
listen to messages on two different topics. On each topic, there can only be
a certain type of message sent and received, which is also provided in the
event signature.
In this specification, the checkPosition event checks whether the gun
is at a safe position to trigger. This means that it should not be pointing
at the robot. This condition corresponds to its angle being greater than
45 degrees. For this purpose, the safeTrigger monitor listens to the topic
/landshark/joint states with the message type sensor msgs/JointState.
Message fields can be accessed by providing necessary parameters as done
here; there are two arrays in sensor msgs/JointState, name and position,
which are bound to variables N and P, respectively. These parameters are used
in the action code of the event to check the validity of the safety condition
by observing the message content.
By the help of event handlers and parameters, monitors can not only ob-
serve the message content, but also decide to either modify the message value
or drop it altogether, or trigger some other action for that matter. For ex-
ample, in checkPosition, the global variable isSafeTrigger is set to true
if and only if the gun is at an angle larger than 45 degrees. At the same time,
this variable is checked in the safeTrigger event to determine whether the
gun is allowed to trigger or not by either relaying the message as is, or not
sending it at all.
4.3 Enforcing Security Policies
Although ROSRV has always been considered as a monitoring framework
from day one, due to its requirement of overseeing all communication be-
tween nodes and the ROSMaster, and as a result wrapping the Master API,
it turned out to be an ideal place to incorporate access control as well. Access
control is meant to rightfully qualify nodes in the system to be allowed to
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carry certain actions. All actions a node may attempt are bounded by the
supported XMLRPC API, and ROS, by default, grants all nodes full access.
However, this situation leaves ROS vulnerable in the face of an attack, as it
makes it very easy for attackers to seize the control of a robot. With our so-
lution, we give the users the privilege to restrict arbitrary nodes’ capabilities
to protect their robot from being exposed.
The access control policies are provided as input in a configuration file to
the RVMaster for their enforcement at runtime. Upon receiving node re-
quests, the RVMaster checks them for compliance to security configurations,
and if it finds them appropriate, it sends them to the ROSMaster for issuing.
For example, a node registering for publishing to a certain topic may or may
not be allowed in the provided configuration, and if the RVMaster decides
that it is not by checking the node identity and the topic name in the request,
it rejects the registration by not passing the request on to the ROSMaster.
Nodes are identified by their IP addresses in the configuration file, instead
of their node names, to prevent attackers from faking a node. From the RV-
Master’s point of view, the identity check of a node is done by extracting the
IP address of the node from its XMLRPC request. However, since normally
the xmlrpcpp [11] library provided in ROS does not expose the IP address
information in RPC invocations, we extended this library and included it as
part of ROSRV. The use of IP addresses implies access granularity at host
level. In order to enhance user experience, we support definitions of IP aliases
and groups so that users do not need to repeatedly deal with IP addresses in
the access control configuration.
Currently, there are four main policy categories available for use. These
are [Nodes], [Subscribers], [Publishers], and [Commands]. Under each
category, the access policies are written as a key followed by an assignment
symbol and a list of values. The following shows what each key and value
list pair corresponds to:
[Nodes]: key = node name, value = machine identity allowed to create the
specified nodes
[Subscribers]: key = topic name, value = node identity allowed to sub-
scribe to the topic
[Publishers]: key = topic name, value = node identity allowed to publish
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to the topic
[Commands]: key = command name, value = node identity allowed to per-
form the command
Next, we will look at an example access control configuration written for
our case study robot LandShark.
4.3.1 Access Control Policy Configuration
[Groups]
localhost = 127.0.0.1 
certikos = ip1 ip2 ip3 ip4 
ocu = ip5 ip6 ip7 ip8
[Nodes]
default=localhost
/landshark_radar=certikos
[Publishers]
default=localhost certikos
/landshark_control/trigger= ocu
[Subscribers]
default = localhost certikos 
/landshark/gps = ocu
[Commands]
# Commands: full access
getSystemState = localhost certikos ocu
# Commands: limited access
lookupNode = localhost certikos
# Commands: local access only
shutdown = localhost
Figure 4.5: Access Control Policy Configuration
Figure 4.5 shows a snippet of the LandShark access control policy config-
uration. The [Group] section defines three groups over 9 IP addresses and
gives them aliases. This indicates, for example, that accesses granted to the
OCU are only valid as long as they come from these specified IP addresses.
In the [Nodes] section, default = localhost means that by default the
machine localhost is allowed to create a node with any name. Names can
also be precise, as in /landshark radar = certikos, which means that the
alias certikos is allowed to create a node with the name /landshark radar.
In the [Publishers] section, only nodes running on machine ocu can
publish to topic /landshark control/trigger. There are two ways an at-
tacker is blocked with the combination of sections supported in the configu-
ration. For example, even when an attacker can query the system state to
get node names in order to impersonate them by replacing them, in this case
knowing the name of a node would not help the attacker as topic publish-
ers and subscribers are explicitly specified by their IP addresses. So even
if the attacker finds out about the name of the node publishing to topic
/landshark control/trigger and creates a node with the same name, as
long as it does not have one of the IP addresses the alias ocu covers, it can-
not register to this topic as a publisher. The second way it may be blocked
is that under [Nodes] section, ocu alias may protect the node names it al-
locates for its purposes. Therefore, even if the attacker can figure out the
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names of nodes publishing to topics it wants to pose as, it would not be able
to create nodes with those names.
In [Commands], getSystemState = localhost certikos ocu means that
nodes running on machines localhost, certikos, or ocu are allowed to send
getSystemState requests to the ROSMaster, and shutdown = localhost
means that only nodes on localhost are allowed to shutdown other nodes.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
We have evaluated our framework according to the following research ques-
tions.
RQ1 - Is the specification language expressive?
Throughout the development of this project, we have had the chance to col-
laborate with other teams who were working with ROS on the same robot,
LandShark. Since we were looking for ideas to test our framework’s capa-
bilities, in particular, our specification language since it is the first step in
defining monitors, it was very convenient for us to work with researchers
who were not involved in the design process of ROSRV. It was especially a
good match when we found out that one of the teams was also dealing with
safety concerns, such as obstacle avoidance. We took this suggestion as an
opportunity to test what ROSRV offered and what needed improvement.
We took four scenarios into consideration for evaluation that one might ask
from a monitoring framework. The first application we tried was logging, as
ROSRV monitors already intercept all messages on a given topic and observe
their contents. This is trivial to express with the specification language;
one can simply access message fields of interest by specifying parameters (as
explained in Chapter 4.2.2), and if desired, log them by writing C++ code
and including it in the event action.
The second scenario we were interested in was safe triggering, because this is
also a valuable monitor for real-life applications, such as military robots. By
using a simple concept like global variables, it was easily possible to specify
this safety property which needed two different topics to be monitored.
The third condition was to keep LandShark in a safe zone and not let it move
out of the restricted area. This was also quite possible with our specification
language. We needed to monitor the messages which carried odometry, GPS
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and velocity information. By accessing the message fields, we were able to
check whether the robot’s GPS data indicated that it was inside of the safe
zone or not. If the GPS and odometry monitors detected that the robot
passed beyond the border of the designated area, by setting a global flag, the
velocity monitor was alerted to drop the message to prevent the robot from
moving forward. This was a convenient scheme to demonstrate monitors’
capability of taking a collaborative action based on information coming from
more than one sensor.
As mentioned, the last one we tested was obstacle avoidance. This one was
the most complex among others. It required checking certain conditions pe-
riodically, and with precise timing. It was about recalculating a radius of
distance based on how fast the robot was moving at a certain time and stop-
ping the robot instantly at that distance if an obstacle was perceived. It was
actually while we were defining this property that we decided to add the two
keywords PUBLISH and MESSAGE to ROSMOP. MESSAGE keyword was
useful in copying all the values of a message’s fields to a global variable with
the same type, without explicitly accessing all the fields. PUBLISH keyword
was used in this case to send an alarm message on a different topic whenever
an obstacle was encountered. All in all, on top of proving that our specifica-
tion language was capable of expressing intricate properties, this also showed
that with challenging examples and user requests, the design can be further
improved.
RQ2 - What is the overall performance?
To assess the overall performance of ROSRV, we conducted several simple
performance tests. For this purpose, we implemented two nodes, one a sim-
ple publisher and the other a simple subscriber [21], in order to test the
overhead of introducing monitors to the system. The only purpose of this
insignificant setup was to measure the average number of messages delivered
to the subscriber with and without the presence of monitors to see how the
system performs in both cases in a certain amount of time. Therefore, we
did not include any time-consuming computations as part of the execution
cycles of the nodes.
In our first experiment, we ran the two nodes which connect to each other
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on a single topic for 10 seconds under 3 conditions. The first condition
was to run them using the ROSMaster alone by initiating it with the ROS-
provided command roscore. In this case, the number of messages sent by
the publisher was 97, and the number of messages received by the subscriber
was 93. The second condition was to run the same nodes with ROSRV by
calling rvcore, but without activating the monitor listening to the topic.
This time, the number of messages sent by the publisher was 95, and the
number of messages received by the subscriber was 90. The third condition
was to activate the monitor, and the numbers we got for messages sent and
received were 94 and 89, respectively. In our experiments, we have seen
that the first few messages originated by the publisher were not received
by the subscriber at all cases; whether the system was run with or without
ROSRV did not matter.
For our second experiment, we used the exact same setup, but this time we
ran the nodes for 10 minutes. The numbers we got out of this experiment
were the following:
First condition (roscore) Messages sent: 5996, Messages received: 5992
Second condition (rvcore -no monitor) Messages sent: 5995, Messages
received: 5990
Third condition (rvcore -monitor) Messages sent: 5992, Messages re-
ceived: 5987
As can be seen, the length of the execution time does not have an impact
on the overhead the monitors impose, as the results are very similar to when
the execution time was only 10 seconds.
For our third experiment, we modified these two nodes to be both publishers
and subscribers. In this setup, node1 was publishing to topic1 and sub-
scribing to topic2, and node2 was publishing to topic2 and subscribing to
topic1. This way, individual nodes had extra instructions to execute. Fur-
thermore, we had the chance to measure the impact of running more than
one monitor. The conditions we ran the experiment under were the same
and here are the results we obtained:
Execution time: 10 seconds
First condition topic1: Messages sent: 97, Messages received: 92;
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topic2: Messages sent: 96, Messages received: 94
Second condition topic1: Messages sent: 96, Messages received: 91;
topic2: Messages sent: 95, Messages received: 91
Third condition topic1: Messages sent: 95, Messages received: 90;
topic2: Messages sent: 94, Messages received: 89
Execution time: 10 minutes
First condition topic1: Messages sent: 5996, Messages received: 5992;
topic2: Messages sent: 5996, Messages received: 5991
Second condition topic1: Messages sent: 5996, Messages received: 5990;
topic2: Messages sent: 5995, Messages received: 5991
Third condition topic1: Messages sent: 5993, Messages received: 5989;
topic2: Messages sent: 5994, Messages received: 5990
In the last experiment we conducted, to see what adding more overhead does
to the performance, we used the PUBLISH keyword inside the event action
to force the monitor to publish to a different topic. What adding PUBLISH
to the monitor does is that instead of only sending intercepted messages to
the subscriber, the monitor is now responsible for sending an extra message
for each one it intercepts. We ran the simple publisher-subscriber setup for
this experiment on only a single topic for 1 minute under again the same
conditions. The following are the numbers we collected:
First condition Messages sent: 594, Messages received: 590
Second condition Messages sent: 596, Messages received: 590
Third condition Messages sent: 595, Messages received: 590
These results show that, even when monitors are busy with extra compu-
tations that users desire them to deal with, the monitoring overhead is still
negligible.
Aside from these simple cases which may not be too convincing by them-
selves, we also tested our framework on the actual LandShark robot. The
complexity of the robot is undoubtedly beyond comparison to these simple
setups. At runtime, it creates more than 10 nodes corresponding to devices
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and sensors on the robot, and communicates on at least 20 topics for its op-
eration. During our experiment, we activated two monitors covering 5 of the
topics, and the overhead we measured was not more than a few milliseconds.
This demonstrates that ROSRV’s applicability is definitely substantial and
the overhead it incurs is tolerable.
On a related note about performance, the current implementation of ROSRV is
centralized. This means that all the monitor nodes live in the same multi-
threaded process. Although in our evaluation with simple tests and the
overall performance we achieved with the LandShark robot, we have found
the message delay caused by monitoring acceptable, the centralized design
may face scalability issues when a more complex robot is in question. In the
future, a decentralized mechanism, such as using a multimaster [22], may
be considered to improve scalability. This approach would also enhance the
fault tolerance of the system, as the current centralized master design is a
single point of failure.
RQ3 - Is the access control effective in restricting nodes?
To assess the capability of our access control implementation, we arranged a
multi-machine setup, where only one of the machines ran the RVMaster and
the other connected to that one by assigning the correct host:port value to
the environment variable ROS MASTER URI after establishing ssh connections
between the two machines. With this setup, and a given access control policy
that restricts publishing to topic1 to only nodes created on the same machine
with the RVMaster, we tried to register a publisher from the second machine.
Upon receiving the XMLRPC request and checking it against the policy
configuration, the RVMaster successfully printed out a message indicating
that this request cannot be carried out. Moreover, we also tested this feature
on LandShark, by trying to kill arbitrary nodes running on the robot from
an external source. As shown in Figure 4.5, the execution of shutdown
command is performed only when the request comes from one of the nodes
of the robot itself. Therefore, our attempt to kill any of the robot’s nodes
failed as expected due to this restriction.
Although our access control is effective in allowing and disallowing nodes’
communication with the ROSMaster the way the user configures, the main
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limitation of our implementation is the dependence on IP addresses and
network routing to ensure security. Our design currently naively trusts IP
addresses. Therefore, it is not protected against possible attackers who can
impersonate trustful sources by spoofing IP addresses or run processes on
the same (virtual) machines as trusted nodes. One way to defend against
such attacks would be to run the RVMaster on a separate (virtual) machine
than where (possibly distrustful) nodes are run. Another, and maybe a com-
plementary way, would be to configure the machines to communicate with
each other using additional security schemes, such as encrypted tunnels. We
have looked into IPsec [15] for this purpose, and confirmed that ROSRV can
work with it and benefit from it. However, we have not yet developed an
automation of such a configuration to provide this level of security in a more
user-friendly way.
37
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The undeniable and ubiquitous presence of robots will always mean that
there might be occasional disasters waiting around the corner. To minimize
the damage and possible disasters themselves, we need to make sure that
robots operate safely and securely. This thesis presents ROSRV, a runtime
verification framework for the Robot Operating System (ROS). Favorable
features of ROS make it one of the most popular robot software development
frameworks, however, it does not offer a safety and security mechanism for
robotic applications to depend on for a more reliable operation. ROSRV aims
to address the vulnerabilities of ROS by monitoring safety properties and
enforcing security policies, with a seamless integration in doing so.
As part of ROSRV, we developed ROSMOP for automatically generat-
ing monitors out of user-defined formal specifications, and a proxy node,
called RVMaster, that injects them into the system transparently at run-
time. The RVMaster also supervises communication of nodes with the ROS-
Master through access control, in order to avoid possible malicious activity
misdirecting the robot.
Our evaluations show that the formal specification language developed for
users to define safety properties is expressive, the overhead introduced by
monitoring is acceptable, and the implemented access control prevents the
operation of the robot from being intruded.
Future Work Currently the runtime verified system is not formally ver-
ified. First of all, this would require a formal model of ROS itself. Then
the next step would be to guarantee that ROSRV indeed complies with this
model. Internally, this requires the proof that generated monitors and glue
code satisfy the desired system properties at runtime, and that the RVMaster
invokes the monitors at correct times. Additionally, tools should be devel-
oped to prove that the automatically generated monitors do actually monitor
the safety properties defined in specifications.
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